How does pure ASN.1 DER parsing protect internal PKI certificates?
Pure client-side ASN.1 DER parsing keeps unreleased internal service hostnames, intranet SAN domains, and vendor signing chains completely off third-party networks. Every TLV tag walk, UTC timestamp check, and fingerprint hash executes locally in browser memory with zero remote certificate uploads.
Infrastructure teams troubleshooting mutual TLS or private PKI rotations regularly inspect certificates built around the IETF RFC 5280 X.509 PKI Certificate Profile. Pasting internal corporate certificates or mistakenly copied keypairs into server-backed web checkers risks exposing topology or secret key material to external logs. Pairing this offline X509 decoder with SAML Decoder keeps both identity provider signing certificates and XML assertions strictly local.
Three built-in safeguards isolate certificate data inside your tab:
- Private key guardrail: Any PEM block containing
PRIVATE KEYis stripped before parsing, accompanied by an immediate warning banner. - Zero live revocation calls: AIA and OCSP responder addresses appear as plain text and never trigger background HTTP lookups.
- No external binaries: Parsing uses pure TypeScript ASN.1 decoding and native browser Web Crypto APIs without remote WASM requests.
PEM, Base64 DER, and multi-cert chain parsing
Input normalization handles single PEM blocks, multi-certificate TLS bundles, bare Base64 DER strings, and binary .der or .cer files defined under the IETF RFC 7468 Textual Encodings of PKIX. Engineers preparing raw encoding conversions between systems can also convert raw DER bytes and PEM text alongside inspecting decoded extensions.
Binary DER header detection and UTCTime date decoding
Uploaded files pass through a lightweight content sniffer inspecting the first 64 bytes for ASCII PEM headers versus binary ASN.1 sequence tags (0x30). Once DER bytes are isolated, the TLV reader decodes multi-byte OIDs, BMPString UTF-16BE labels, and GeneralizedTime or two-digit UTCTime values using the standard pivot rule (>= 50 maps to 19xx, < 50 maps to 20xx). Both legacy 13-byte UTCTime certificates and post-2049 GeneralizedTime timestamps decode accurately.
Sequential chain verification and self-signed badges
Stacked PEM bundles populate ordered cards from #1 downward alongside a Chain verification banner. Each adjacent pair verifies whether the child Issuer matches the parent Subject, detecting swapped intermediates or missing links immediately while marking matching Issuer and Subject certificates with a Self-signed badge and CA:TRUE roots with a CA badge. Keeping leaf, intermediate, and root certificates ordered top-to-bottom prevents TLS handshake chain errors.
Public keys, SHA-256 fingerprints, and X.509 extensions
Cryptographic metadata and extension bitfields map cleanly to human-readable labels and tabular OID breakdowns. Computing the SHA-256 certificate fingerprint relies on the browser-native MDN SubtleCrypto.digest Web Crypto API documentation implementation without external libraries.
| Certificate attribute | OID or algorithm supported | Decoded inspection details |
|---|---|---|
| Public key algorithm | RSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, Ed448 | Modulus sizes like 2048 bits or curve bit widths |
| Subject Alternative Name | 2.5.29.17 |
DNS:, URI:, email:, IPv4 4 bytes, IPv6 16 bytes |
| Basic Constraints | 2.5.29.19 |
CA boolean flag and optional pathLen limit |
| Key Usage flags | 2.5.29.15 |
Nine bitmask usages including digitalSignature, keyCertSign |
| Extended Key Usage | 2.5.29.37 |
Six server, client, email, code signing, OCSP, timestamp OIDs |
RSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448 public key bit sizes
SubjectPublicKeyInfo extraction parses RSA modulus lengths such as 2048 bits and 4096 bits cleanly while identifying named elliptic curves like P-256 (256 bits), P-384 (384 bits), P-521 (521 bits), and secp256k1 (256 bits). Modern Edwards-curve keys such as Ed25519 at 256 bits and Ed448 at 448 bits also display exact algorithm labels.
SAN entries, Key Usage, EKU, and plain-text AIA URLs
Every parsed extension appears both in quick top-level summary cards and inside the collapsible X.509 extensions (N) table showing OID, criticality, and formatted values. Operators cross-checking certificate checksums against server binary artifacts can confirm digests separately with SHA-256 and SHA-1 file checksum verification workflows.
PKCS#10 CSR inspection and JSON export workflows
Submitting malformed signing requests wastes hours waiting on Certificate Authority approval cycles. Parsing requests formatted to IETF RFC 2986 PKCS #10 Certification Request Syntax lets teams inspect SAN extensions, algorithms, and key strength prior to issuance.
Decoding Extension Request SANs before CA signing
For CERTIFICATE REQUEST payloads, the decoder checks Attribute entries for the PKCS#10 Extension Request OID (1.2.840.113549.1.9.14). Embedded SANs, Basic Constraints, and Key Usage requests render identically to issued certificates while displaying a neutral csr status pill instead of validity dates.
Exporting structured x509-decoded.json audit records
Clicking Export JSON serializes every decoded certificate or CSR, chain status, public key detail, and extension list to x509-decoded.json.
SubtleCrypto calculates SHA-256 across 32 bytes (256 bits) and SHA-1 across 20 bytes (160 bits) directly over each raw DER payload in memory, generating reproducible uppercase colon-delimited thumbprints ready for pin lists and inventory spreadsheets.
What validation limits apply to local certificate inspection?
Offline ASN.1 parsing checks certificate syntax, extension OIDs, clock windows, and Issuer/Subject name linking, rather than trusting roots or querying online revocation endpoints. Complete TLS trust evaluation still requires checking signatures against an OS root store and contacting live CRL or OCSP responders.
Additionally, definite ASN.1 DER lengths support up to 4 length octets (covering certificates larger than 64 KB), while .p7b PKCS#7 SignedData envelopes require exporting individual PEM certificates first before loading.
Keep these offline diagnostic boundaries in mind when auditing production TLS chains:
- Chain order vs signature math: Linking checks confirm consecutive
IssuerandSubjectstrings rather than verifying RSA or ECDSA issuer signatures against a trusted root store. - No external OCSP queries: Using an SSL certificate decoder offline avoids leaking serial numbers over the network, meaning live revocation status must still be checked from an authorized host.
- Portable wiki summaries: When compiling compliance notes from JSON exports, teams can convert report snippets into portable Markdown PKI audit notes without manual HTML cleanup while keeping internal PKI inspection strictly local.