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SAML request and response decoder

Debug corporate SSO logins safely on your own machine without pasting live SAML assertions or user emails into public web tools.

Inflates DEFLATE Redirect bindings and parses embedded X.509 certs locally.

How to use SAML decoder

  1. Paste a payload or load a sample. Drop an exported .xml, .txt, or .saml file, paste an HTTP-POST Base64 string or full HTTP-Redirect URL into the editor, or click Load sample POST Response or Load sample Redirect AuthnRequest.
  2. Run local decompression and parsing. Click Decode SAML payload to unwrap query parameters, inflate RFC 1951 DEFLATE streams or Base64 blobs, and format indented SAML XML inside browser memory.
  3. Extract Issuer, NameID, and attribute statement claims. Review the four top status cards, inspection warnings, 16-field envelope grid, Attribute statement table, and embedded X.509 signing certificate cards.
  4. Copy or save formatted XML. Click Copy XML for ticket notes or Save .xml to download saml-decoded.xml without exposing live enterprise assertions to third-party web tools.

Everything runs in this browser tab. Nothing you paste or open is uploaded or logged, so it's safe for keys, tokens and private data.

How does offline SAML assertion decoding protect SSO logins?

Running SAML decoding solely inside your browser prevents corporate single sign-on assertions, user email claims, and RelayState redirects from leaving your workstation. Everything from URL query extraction through DEFLATE decompression and X.509 certificate inspection stays local with zero server logs.

When engineers debug broken enterprise logins governed by the OASIS SAML 2.0 Core Specification, live responses carry real NameID principals, role group lists, and valid SessionIndex identifiers. Pasting those blobs into public web decoders exposes internal directory claims to remote request logs. Pairing local assertion inspection with HAR File Analyzer lets teams troubleshoot full SSO redirect chains while stripping sensitive tokens from capture files.

Local browser execution prevents three frequent SSO troubleshooting leaks:

  • Zero payload egress: Assertions never touch remote servers, CDNs, or telemetry endpoints.
  • No external metadata calls: Embedded certificates are decoded directly without querying IdP federation URLs.
  • One-click reset: Clicking Clear drops decoded XML, certificate details, and claim tables from view immediately.

HTTP-Redirect DEFLATE vs HTTP-POST Base64 bindings

Identity Providers and Service Providers transmit SAML XML across browsers using two primary bindings with distinct encoding layers. For standalone federation descriptors that do not use Base64 transport wrappers, engineers can also format and validate standalone SAML XML metadata directly in a dedicated tree view.

Extracting query parameters from IdP and SP redirects

Pasting a complete redirect URL triggers URLSearchParams extraction for SAMLRequest, SAMLResponse, RelayState, SigAlg, and Signature. After reversing percent-encoding such as %2B and %3D, the decoder applies raw decompression defined in the IETF RFC 1951 DEFLATE compression standard and automatically falls back to zlib headers when unusual SP libraries include them.

When someone pastes raw < XML or HTTP-POST Base64 strings instead, the decoder detects the binding automatically as raw-xml or http-post-base64. Output then passes through a 2-space XML formatter for clean reading or downloading as saml-decoded.xml.

Namespace-agnostic XML parsing across six message kinds

Enterprise identity vendors vary widely in prefix conventions, alternating between saml:, saml2:, samlp:, and ds: namespaces. The parser walks DOM nodes using stripped local element names so AuthnRequest, Response, LogoutRequest, LogoutResponse, standalone Assertion, and generic SAML XML documents decode uniformly.

Envelope claims, timestamps, and attribute statements

Decoded metadata maps directly onto fields defined in the OASIS SAML 2.0 Bindings Specification and core schema. Comparing decoded SSO identities against federation tokens is common during multi-protocol migrations alongside inspecting OIDC and Bearer JWT token payloads.

Diagnostic group Inspected XML or query fields Common SSO failure revealed
Transport binding SAMLRequest, SAMLResponse, RelayState, SigAlg Double URL-encoding or raw DEFLATE mismatch
Protocol envelope ID, InResponseTo, IssueInstant, Destination ACS URL typo or unsolicited IdP response
Subject identity Issuer, NameID, NameID Format, AuthnContext Email vs persistent GUID mapping mismatch
Validity conditions NotBefore, NotOnOrAfter, Audiences, Status Code Clock skew beyond 5 minutes or EntityID mismatch
Signature and PKI SignatureMethod, DigestMethod, X509Certificate Deprecated SHA-1 URI or rotated IdP signing cert

Sixteen envelope fields and NotBefore validity windows

The Envelope & subject claims grid surfaces 16 standard attributes including Issuer, NameID, NameID Format, Status Code, ID, InResponseTo, IssueInstant, Destination / ACS URL, NotBefore, NotOnOrAfter, Audiences, SessionIndex, AuthnContext, RelayState, Signature Algorithm, and Digest / Reference. Validity state turns green (valid) when the browser clock sits inside the window, or flags expired and not-yet-valid errors immediately.

User attributes, RelayState, and SessionIndex auditing

Below the envelope grid, the Attribute statement (N) table renders multi-valued user attributes such as email, first name, department, and security group memberships. Matching RelayState and SessionIndex values helps Service Provider teams trace why single logout calls fail or why deep-link landing URLs drop query context.

Embedded XML signatures and X.509 certificate checks

Broken SAML logins frequently trace back to rotated Identity Provider signing certificates or rejected hash algorithms. Structural inspection follows the W3C XML Signature Syntax and Processing 1.1 element layout without contacting external certificate authorities.

Flagging unsigned assertions and deprecated SHA-1 URIs

An Inspection notes banner highlights actionable misconfigurations right after decoding finishes. Unsigned Response or Assertion payloads, expired timestamps, clock skew mismatches, and legacy SHA-1 URIs generating 160 bits digests in SignatureMethod, DigestMethod, or redirect SigAlg parameters appear as clear warnings rather than buried XML attributes. Treating unsigned assertions as immediate troubleshooting errors prevents accidental acceptance testing against unverified identity responses.

Reading embedded X.509 certificates and SHA-256 digests

Every <ds:X509Certificate> element inside KeyInfo is decoded locally to display the certificate subject, issuer, serial number, validity dates, and 256 bits SHA-256 fingerprint using Web Crypto. When you need full SAN extensions, Basic Constraints, or key usage bitfields from a standalone PEM, switch to full X.509 signing certificate inspection without OpenSSL to audit leaf and intermediate chains cleanly.

The decoder verifies structural presence of SignatureMethod, DigestMethod, and embedded X509Certificate blocks, computes local 256 bits SHA-256 digests via Web Crypto, and flags SHA-1 URIs without running Exclusive XML Canonicalization against external IdP metadata.

What verification limits apply when debugging signed SAML XML locally?

Local decoding decodes transport bindings, parses claims, and flags weak SHA-1 algorithms, but it does not cryptographically verify XML signatures against a Service Provider trust store. Canonicalization verification requires pinned IdP federation metadata, while encrypted assertions require the Service Provider private key.

Specifically, SAML assertions wrapped inside <EncryptedAssertion> keep their inner attributes encrypted until decrypted with the matching RSA or EC private key on the receiving server. Without that private key, local inspection can read outer Response metadata, Issuer tags, and Status Code diagnostics only.

Large enterprise payloads under 100 KB carrying dozens of directory groups render cleanly in browser memory. Redirect URLs exceeding 2048 bytes should switch to HTTP-POST bindings to avoid browser truncation, and assertions older than 24 hours remain readable with an expired validity badge while preserving full XML text for troubleshooting.

Always run final trust signature validation inside your Service Provider staging environment using verified IdP metadata certificates before shipping SSO configuration changes to production.

Questions

Why is pasting live SAML assertions into online decoders risky?

Live SAML assertions contain corporate email addresses, employee IDs, role groups, SessionIndex handles, and RelayState URLs. If an assertion is still inside its NotOnOrAfter window or handled by a server-logging site, leaked XML can enable unauthorized session inspection or impersonation attempts.

How do SAML HTTP-Redirect DEFLATE and HTTP-POST Base64 differ?

HTTP-POST encodes raw SAML XML with standard Base64 inside an HTML form submission without compression. HTTP-Redirect compresses the XML using raw RFC 1951 DEFLATE without zlib headers, Base64-encodes the compressed bytes, and URL-encodes the SAMLRequest or SAMLResponse query parameter.

Does SAML Decoder cryptographically verify XML signatures?

No. The decoder detects whether a Signature element exists, parses SignatureMethod and DigestMethod URIs, warns on weak SHA-1 algorithms, and decodes embedded X.509 certificates locally. Full XMLDSig canonicalization and trust verification require comparing signed digests against pinned IdP metadata on your Service Provider.

Why does an assertion show expired or not yet valid?

SAML Conditions include NotBefore and NotOnOrAfter timestamps evaluated against your browser clock in UTC. An expired assertion usually comes from replaying an old capture, while a not-yet-valid error indicates clock skew between the Identity Provider server and the workstation or Service Provider.

Can the decoder unwrap full Identity Provider redirect URLs?

Yes. Pasting an entire IdP or SP redirect URL automatically parses SAMLRequest, SAMLResponse, RelayState, SigAlg, and Signature query parameters, reverses URL percent-encoding, and inflates the compressed XML payload in one step.

Why are encrypted SAML assertions unreadable without keys?

When an Identity Provider encrypts the Assertion element inside EncryptedAssertion, the inner NameID and user attributes are sealed with the Service Provider public key. A browser tool without the Service Provider private RSA or EC key can inspect outer Response status codes only.

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